By Sávio Cavalcante
The huge reaction to what André Janones accomplished in this year’s election, both in Brazil and abroad, is more than deserved. By organizing the Lula’s Army channel on WhatsApp, Janones gave the progressive camp an effective social media strategy against the far right. He taught millions of people to act on a hostile battlefield, one defined by the business model of Big Tech. Tied closely to the streets, this cohesive, militant mass movement made possible what had seemed unlikely just weeks earlier.
Congressman André Janones (REDE) with President Lula (photo: Ricardo Stuckert)
There is another lesson, though, and few people have commented on it. The New York Times captured it in a story on Janones: “He is not only a critic of the right, but also of what Brazilians call the ‘caviar left,’ whom he accuses of ‘elitism and intellectual arrogance’ and of alienating the working class.”
The problem is more complicated than it first appears. It calls for a discussion that gets beyond the usual, fragile terms of the culture wars.
First, one of the main strategies of the new right, especially in its origins in the United States, was to denounce what it saw as the moral hypocrisy of people associated with the progressive camp. These were people who claimed egalitarian principles in the abstract but, in practice, especially in cultural disputes, behaved in ways that contradicted them. Quite a few critics of the new right took the same road. Public debate never lacked people who enjoyed, and profited from, pointing a finger at the gap between ideas and practice.
On its own, this argument from the new right, including the far right, never settled the underlying moral conflict. Strictly speaking, saying that a progressive does not live up to what he or she declares does nothing to weaken the normative force of egalitarian principles. It is even worse when the criticism comes from a radical religious right, since that right itself only promises justice and equality after death.
The rhetoric of reaction was not limited to the hypocrisy thesis. Still, the thesis did its job with undeniable success. It carried reactionary rhetoric across classes, from the top of society to the bottom. In other words, it morally and culturally united both a minority that benefits from keeping inequality in place and a mass of people who would have better lives if inequality were reduced.
Why did the reactionary hypocrisy thesis work against the progressive camp? The answer calls for a sociological explanation. When educated middle class people embrace egalitarian causes, they cannot dissolve the force of distinction, no matter how faithful they try to be to their ideas. Every person has to “play” that game to stay in a privileged class position. So the hypocrisy thesis has a material basis: the objective position of middle class progressives in the social structure tends to clash with their political leanings. At the limit, it is the social world, not personal inconsistency, that produces the symptoms of the caviar left. Of course, some people never even think about doing something to reduce the problem.
What does Janones have to do with this? His army of millions is certainly diverse and spans several classes. But for the progressive middle class, gripped by panic over the looming disaster, Janones offered a powerful, if situational, solution. It addressed the contradictions between their objective position and their subjective leanings.
First, he showed them they were ignorant about political action on social media and, like a teacher, taught the uninitiated what to do. Second, using military rhetoric, he demanded that everyone give up what they hold most dear: the feeling of being unique, special individuals who, with their own ideas and autonomy, do not get swept up in mass action. Quite a few followed his orders. In private, though, they complained to their peers about the shallowness of “cultural Janonism.” Third, he set the agenda of the day that everyone was expected to follow. In short, he managed to impose unity within the diversity of the progressive camp. Fourth, he chose topics guided by problems that directly affect the majority of Brazil’s working class.
In the end, the educated progressive middle class was grateful to be made into rank and file activists. It celebrated Janones, who was subsequently treated to a special dinner with famous artists at Caetano Veloso’s home, a dream out of reach for 99.9% of his peers.
What remains to be seen is what lesson middle class progressives will take into the rest of the war, which continues into Lula’s new term. Will they keep up their activism, in the streets and online, for structural reforms to fight inequality? That means winning the “third round” against “Faria Lima,” São Paulo’s financial district. And will they find a way to take back moral hegemony in society from the far right, in favor of egalitarianism? Within the limits of what is socially possible, that means deep reflection on their own practices of cultural distinction from the vast majority of the people.
Sávio Cavalcante is a professor of sociology at the Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences (IFCH) of the State University of Campinas (Unicamp).
This article first appeared in LeMonde Diplomatique Brasil, was translated with the express authorization of its editor-in-chief by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.