The huge reaction to what André Janones accomplished in this year’s election, both in Brazil and abroad, is more than deserved. By organizing the Lula’s Army channel on WhatsApp, Janones gave the progressive camp an effective social media strategy against the far right. He taught millions of people to act on a hostile battlefield, one defined by the business model of Big Tech. Tied closely to the streets, this cohesive, militant mass movement made possible what had seemed unlikely just weeks earlier.

Congressman André Janones (REDE) with President Lula (photo: Ricardo Stuckert)

There is another lesson, though, and few people have commented on it. The New York Times captured it in a story on Janones: “He is not only a critic of the right, but also of what Brazilians call the ‘caviar left,’ whom he accuses of ‘elitism and intellectual arrogance’ and of alienating the working class.”

The problem is more complicated than it first appears. It calls for a discussion that gets beyond the usual, fragile terms of the culture wars.

First, one of the main strategies of the new right, especially in its origins in the United States, was to denounce what it saw as the moral hypocrisy of people associated with the progressive camp. These were people who claimed egalitarian principles in the abstract but, in practice, especially in cultural disputes, behaved in ways that contradicted them. Quite a few critics of the new right took the same road. Public debate never lacked people who enjoyed, and profited from, pointing a finger at the gap between ideas and practice.

On its own, this argument from the new right, including the far right, never settled the underlying moral conflict. Strictly speaking, saying that a progressive does not live up to what he or she declares does nothing to weaken the normative force of egalitarian principles. It is even worse when the criticism comes from a radical religious right, since that right itself only promises justice and equality after death.

The rhetoric of reaction was not limited to the hypocrisy thesis. Still, the thesis did its job with undeniable success. It carried reactionary rhetoric across classes, from the top of society to the bottom. In other words, it morally and culturally united both a minority that benefits from keeping inequality in place and a mass of people who would have better lives if inequality were reduced.

Why did the reactionary hypocrisy thesis work against the progressive camp? The answer calls for a sociological explanation. When educated middle class people embrace egalitarian causes, they cannot dissolve the force of distinction, no matter how faithful they try to be to their ideas. Every person has to “play” that game to stay in a privileged class position. So the hypocrisy thesis has a material basis: the objective position of middle class progressives in the social structure tends to clash with their political leanings. At the limit, it is the social world, not personal inconsistency, that produces the symptoms of the caviar left. Of course, some people never even think about doing something to reduce the problem.

What does Janones have to do with this? His army of millions is certainly diverse and spans several classes. But for the progressive middle class, gripped by panic over the looming disaster, Janones offered a powerful, if situational, solution. It addressed the contradictions between their objective position and their subjective leanings.

First, he showed them they were ignorant about political action on social media and, like a teacher, taught the uninitiated what to do. Second, using military rhetoric, he demanded that everyone give up what they hold most dear: the feeling of being unique, special individuals who, with their own ideas and autonomy, do not get swept up in mass action. Quite a few followed his orders. In private, though, they complained to their peers about the shallowness of “cultural Janonism.” Third, he set the agenda of the day that everyone was expected to follow. In short, he managed to impose unity within the diversity of the progressive camp. Fourth, he chose topics guided by problems that directly affect the majority of Brazil’s working class.

In the end, the educated progressive middle class was grateful to be made into rank and file activists. It celebrated Janones, who was subsequently treated to a special dinner with famous artists at Caetano Veloso’s home, a dream out of reach for 99.9% of his peers.

What remains to be seen is what lesson middle class progressives will take into the rest of the war, which continues into Lula’s new term. Will they keep up their activism, in the streets and online, for structural reforms to fight inequality? That means winning the “third round” against “Faria Lima,” São Paulo’s financial district. And will they find a way to take back moral hegemony in society from the far right, in favor of egalitarianism? Within the limits of what is socially possible, that means deep reflection on their own practices of cultural distinction from the vast majority of the people.

Sávio Cavalcante is a professor of sociology at the Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences (IFCH) of the State University of Campinas (Unicamp).

This article first appeared in LeMonde Diplomatique Brasil, was translated with the express authorization of its editor-in-chief by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

By Henrique Rodrigues

In a deeply questionable approach to the journalistic scrutiny this story demanded, The Washington Post published an article on Saturday that gave wide space to known falsehoods spread by fugitive Brazilian Senator Flávio Bolsonaro. The paper did not push back on them as sharply as the subject requires. It let a right wing extremist spread absurd lies about Brazilian institutions with no emphatic corrections. Owned by billionaire Jeff Bezos, the paper handed readers an unmistakable “softball” piece. It was built on a sympathetic, condescending narrative that ignores the gravity of the facts and Brazil’s laws.

Flávio Bolsonaro, who WAPO portrays wistfully gazing at a chocolate donut, is currently under Brazilian federal police investigation for allegedly laundering US $12 million. (photo: Beto Barata/Agência Senado)

While Brazilian democracy comes under attack from a coup narrative with no factual basis, The Post chose to open its story with a picturesque scene. It shows Bolsonaro in a Florida coworking space, gazing wistfully at an iced chocolate doughnut with sprinkles. By painting its subject as “sad,” “confused” and prone to typically American habits, the paper softens the image of a a man under investigation for serious crimes who recently snuck out of Brazil. It also exposes its own permissive editorial line toward the rise of the global far right.

The paper’s promotional post on social media, though, seems to strike a different editorial tone. “After losing Brazil’s election, sneaking to Miami and proclaiming himself rightful president, Flávio Bolsonaro tells The Post he doesn’t know what he’s going to do now, or next.” reads the post on the paper’s official X account.

Complicit Silence in the Face of Lies and the Denial of Democracy

The Post’s loudest failure is its deliberate refusal to rebut him with the force serious journalism demands. In the interview, unlike in the tough promotional post, Bolsonaro repeated the absurd claim that Brazil is no longer a democracy. He said, without offering a shred of evidence, that Donald Trump is “convinced” of this premise. Bolsonaro himself admitted to the reporter that he has no proof of the electoral fraud he alleged. Given such an explicit admission of disinformation, any outlet committed to the truth should have flatly contradicted him. It should have restored the facts in the final version that reached its readers.

Brazil is the world’s ninth largest economy and one of the most influential nations on the planet. It has been a consolidated, unbroken democracy since 1985, when the country ended its last military dictatorship. Its elections are auditable, fast and internationally recognized for their undisputed integrity. They even elected Bolsonaro and his father several times over the decades. Staying silent, or simply noting “what the other side says,” gives a stage to ideological lies. As a matter of fact, there is no “other side” when the question is the integrity of the electoral system. The election was clean, and there was no fraud of any kind.

The Post’s story also stumbles badly in how it describes the players in the justice system, not just in what it leaves out about Brazilian democracy. It calls Justice Alexandre de Moraes of the Supreme Federal Court a “longtime adversary of the Bolsonaro family.” That phrasing is false and perverse. Moraes is not a political or personal rival. He is a Supreme Court justice carrying out his constitutional duties. He is the lead justice in the criminal cases and investigations that held hundreds of people accountable for attempting a coup.

Different Outlets, Different Journalistic Treatment

The Post’s stance looks even worse next to the work of other mainstream media outlets. The New York Times showed how journalism should respond to authoritarian figures. For every unsupported claim from Flávio Bolsonaro or his allies, correspondent Ana Ionova issued explicit corrections. She directly rebutted at least eight lies with data, facts and historical context. The Times dismantled the “political persecution” pose with rigor, and it subtly, discreetly mocked the role of victim the fugitive has taken on.

At Bezos’ paper, by contrast, readers find a gently toned human interest story about a man “uncertain about the future.” The story softens the real situation of the people involved. Jair Bolsonaro is not a wronged man. He is a convicted criminal who plotted a violent military coup against the republic, and he is serving his sentence under house arrest. Likewise, Flávio Bolsonaro is not a “humanitarian exile.” He is under investigation for several crimes, including money laundering and corruption. He also defied explicit court orders to flee the country and avoid answering to the courts.

Political Alignment and the Interests of Billionaire Capital

The Post’s condescension does not exist in an editorial vacuum. It reflects the ideological turn driven by its owner, billionaire Jeff Bezos. In recent years, Bezos has openly moved closer to Donald Trump’s political circle and the Republican Party. He has made large financial donations to the group’s campaigns. He has also intervened directly in the paper’s decision making, including blocking its traditional editorial endorsements of Democratic candidates.

The Post’s story leans on Trump to back its criticism of Brazil. Yet Trump himself has repeatedly denied the results of U.S. elections and incited the 2021 storming of the Capitol. Using him as a yardstick for the quality of a foreign country’s democracy is an untenable logical contradiction. The Post’s alignment with this view serves its owner’s geopolitical and economic interests. It sacrifices factual truth for a narrative convenient to Trumpism.

By the end of the Post’s article, what stands out is not a search for the truth but a piece built on sympathy and passivity. The paper turned criminal accusations and antidemocratic theories into a mere “personal dilemma” for a man enjoying a doughnut in a Florida office. In doing so, it did a disservice to global public opinion. It also confirmed that a press kept by billionaires aligned with extremism would rather cover for lies than face the facts.

This article initially appeared in Revista Fórum, was translated with the express authorization of its editor-in-chief by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

Descendants of Italians in Brazil typically wait years for Italian citizenship. But on November 6, during a session of the Chamber of Deputies in Rome, the Italian government admitted that it granted citizenship to Eduardo, Carlos and Flávio Bolsonaro in 58 days.

Flávio Bolsonaro hugs Italy’s right wing extremist Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini (photo: social media)

Green party Parliamentarian Angelo Bonelli announced that he is requesting a criminal inquiry into how the citizenship was granted. He warned of an escape plan in which the Italian passport would serve as a shield against Brazilian prosecution.

“Unfortunately, it is confirmed that Flávio, Eduardo and Carlos received priority treatment from the embassy,” Bonelli said. He noted that other descendants of Italians can wait up to 10 years. For the three brothers, he said, it took only 58 days from the date they were called in to have their application reviewed. “It is absolutely unacceptable. These are people who use the Italian passport to flee from justice.”

Bonelli also said the faster processing of the three passports coincided with the 2022 election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

The Italian government’s position

Matilde Siracusano, an undersecretary who represents Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government to lawmakers, said the government followed the law. “As the government has already said in response to parliamentary questions, Italy recognized the citizenship of Eduardo, Flávio and Carlos Bolsonaro in accordance with the rules in force at the time and with the procedures set by law,” she said.

Siracusano said Eduardo Bolsonaro asked to join the waiting list at the Consular Office of the Italian Embassy in Brasília on Dec. 22, 2020. Carlos and Flávio Bolsonaro asked on Oct. 26, 2021. She said all three lived in Brasília when they applied and submitted the required documents.

On Oct. 20, 2021, about a year after joining the waiting list, Eduardo Bolsonaro contacted the Consular Office to ask about his case, Siracusano said. On Nov. 18, 2022, a year later, the brothers were able to file formal applications for recognition of citizenship iure sanguinis (by right of blood).

Siracusano said Carlos and Flávio Bolsonaro were called in at the same time as Eduardo, who had joined the list earlier. She called this an established practice: applications from descendants of the same Italian ancestor are processed together.

Citizenship was granted to the three brothers on Jan. 5, 2023, Siracusano said. She said their documents were complete and met the rules at the time. Following standard procedure, the embassy also requested their registration in the AIRE (Registry of Italians Residing Abroad) on the same occasion.

The passports were issued months later. Flávio Bolsonaro received his on Nov. 8, 2023. Eduardo Bolsonaro received his on April 3, 2024, and Carlos Bolsonaro on June 14, 2024.

Siracusano said the Italian Embassy in Brasília had no record of pending court cases against the brothers when it issued the passports. She added that recognition of citizenship by blood involves no discretion by the administration. The official in charge only checks whether the applicant meets the criteria set by law.

Under the legal framework in force when the applications were filed, she said, citizenship could be recognized for anyone with an unbroken line of descent from an Italian ancestor, with no generational limit.

Jair Bolsonaro will not get a passport

Siracusano said the rule changed later. A reform pushed by Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani, enacted in Decree Law 36 of March 28, 2025, introduced stricter criteria. Recognition of citizenship now requires a more direct and substantial link to Italy.

In practice, the new law will keep cases like that of former President Jair Bolsonaro from getting a passport as easily as his sons did.

Escape plan

Bonelli reacted to the government’s answer with indignation. Holding an Italian passport in his hand, he asked the rest of the chamber how it could accept the Bolsonaro family using the document as a weapon against the courts.

Bonelli recalled that Eduardo Bolsonaro recorded a video in which he challenged Justice Alexandre de Moraes. To show he would not be caught, Eduardo displayed an Italian passport. “He used the Italian passport to insult a judge,” Bonelli said.

Bonelli repeated Eduardo Bolsonaro’s words in Portuguese, including the profanity.

Background

The hearing took place after Bonelli submitted a written question asking the government to explain Flávio Bolsonaro’s case. He wanted to know whether the government is aware of the investigations in Brazil involving Flávio Bolsonaro. He also asked what steps it plans to take “to avoid the risk that Italian citizenship becomes, in practice, an instrument to escape justice at the international level.” Bonelli also asked whether the government will assess if there are grounds to revoke the passports held by Jair Bolsonaro’s sons.

Meloni acknowledged Lula’s victory in the October elections. But the governing coalition in Italy has included Matteo Salvini in recent years. Salvini is deputy prime minister and the leader of the country’s far right. He is an ally of Jair Bolsonaro. After the first round of the Brazilian elections, Salvini posted a photo of himself hugging Flávio Bolsonaro and congratulating him on his victory. Salvini called Flávio Bolsonaro “my friend” and described the result as “extraordinary.”

In his question to Meloni’s government, Bonelli noted that Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro, sons of then President Jair Bolsonaro, asked in 2020 to join the waiting list at the Consular Office of the Italian Embassy in Brasília. They sought recognition of citizenship iure sanguinis and presented proof of residence in Brasília.

On Nov. 8, 2022, nine days after their father’s electoral defeat, Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro went to the embassy to check on their applications.

On June 13, 2025, in response to parliamentary question No. 2-00631, the government confirmed that Flávio, Eduardo and Carlos Bolsonaro had completed the process and obtained Italian citizenship. Flávio and Eduardo got it in 2023, and Carlos in 2024.

Bonelli noted that the embassy in Brasília suspended the scheduling of citizenship appointments in August 2018 and kept only a waiting list of interested applicants. In November 2022, the appointments being processed were for requests made in 2018. “It is necessary to verify whether the Bolsonaros were called in the chronological order of the waiting list or received preferential treatment over other applicants,” Bonelli wrote.

Bonelli also wrote that Decree Law 36 of 2025 significantly restricted recognition of citizenship iure sanguinis. “As a result, many descendants of Italians will no longer be able to obtain it, while the sons of Bolsonaro, who was convicted in Brazil of attempting a coup, obtained it quite quickly,” he wrote.

The investigations

In the request to the government, Bonelli described Flávio Bolsonaro’s record. Flávio Bolsonaro was defeated in the Oct. 25, 2026, presidential election. Bonelli wrote that he is the target of two Federal Police investigations supervised by the Supreme Federal Court.

Moraes oversees the first investigation, which involves money laundering allegations tied to betting companies and payment platforms linked to lawyer Willer Tomaz. It includes possible access to accounts held by an offshore entity.

Justice André Mendonça oversees the second, which concerns the financing of the film “Dark Horse” by Daniel Vorcaro, former controlling shareholder of Banco Master. Vorcaro in currently in jail awaiting trial for currency evasion, criminal association, money laundering and corruption.

Bonelli also noted that Rio de Janeiro state prosecutors charged Flávio Bolsonaro with embezzlement, criminal association and money laundering. The case was halted after the Supreme Court annulled the evidence gathered, without ruling on the merits.

Bonelli also said that on June 16, 2026, the court’s First Panel unanimously convicted Eduardo Bolsonaro and sentenced him to four years and two months in prison. The charge was coercion in the course of a judicial proceeding, specifically for trying to interfere in the trial over the coup attempt. The conviction became final on Oct. 31, 2026. On Oct. 7, 2026, Moraes ordered Eduardo Bolsonaro’s arrest and the cancellation of all his Brazilian passports.

More broadly, Bonelli warned about the use of the Italian passport as a shield against justice. In the request, he cited former Rep. Carla Zambelli. After her conviction in Brazil, Zambelli said she felt “untouchable” because of her Italian passport. Bonelli said this illustrates the risk that Italian citizenship could be used to escape justice in one’s own country.

What Bonelli wants to know

Bonelli now wants all the information needed to establish when the three brothers asked to join the waiting list at the embassy in Brasília. He also wants the dates they were called in, the dates they submitted the required documents and the dates they obtained citizenship.

He also asks when the embassy resumed scheduling appointments after the August 2018 suspension. He wants to know how many applicants who joined the list earlier were still waiting for an appointment at that time. He asks whether the three brothers received priority service, or service outside the chronological order.

If they received preferential treatment, Bonelli wants to know the criteria and who at the embassy authorized it.

Bonelli also asks whether the government plans formal inspections of how the procedures were handled in the case of Bolsonaro’s sons, to guarantee equal treatment for all applicants. He wants the government to give Parliament the results of any such inspections.

This article first appeared in ICL Notícias, was translated with express authorization from the editor by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

Former Paraguayan President Santiago Peña was moved from house arrest to a military unit within the Armed Forces overnight on Friday, October 6. The relocation followed an incident in which protesters surrounded his residence in Asunción, demanding his incarceration in a formal prison facility, which led to clashes with the police.

Peña was removed from office hours earlier, after the Senate voted unanimously to impeach him. The impeachment stemmed from his alleged involvement in the collapse of Ueno Bank, an institution that blocked access to funds for approximately 40% of the Paraguayan population.

The case bears similarities to the financial scandal in Brazil involving Daniel Vorcaro’s Banco Master, which implicated former presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro, a significant portion of the Bolsonaro movement and the political right in Brazil.

U.S. President Donald Trump greets Santiago Peña, President of the Republic of Paraguay, as he hosts the “The Shield of the Americas Summit” at the Trump National Doral Golf Club on March 7, 2026 in Doral, Florida. (Photo by Roberto Schmidt/Getty Images)

According to the Argentine digital news outlet Infobae, the military organized Peña’s extraction from his home in the La Piedad neighborhood of Asunción, using three pickup trucks for the transfer. The operation took place shortly before midnight, after escalating tensions near his residence made it untenable for the former president to remain there.

Footage captured by the Paraguayan newspaper ABC Color shows individuals throwing eggs and shouting insults at the vehicle transporting Peña as the convoy departed. The same outlet reported that Paraguayan intelligence identified the infiltration of agitators within the crowd, individuals who had previously been participating in a protest in the city center and allegedly moved to the residence with the intent of inciting violence.

During the clashes between police and protesters, Commissioner Pedro Barbera, head of the 10th Police Precinct, sustained an injury to his eyebrow. Those present demanded that Peña be sent to the Tacumbú National Penitentiary rather than being held under house arrest.

People take part in a protest outside the home of impeached Paraguayan President Santiago Peña after he was placed under house arrest over a banking crisis in Asuncion on November 6, 2026 (Photo by DANIEL DUARTE / AFP via Getty Images)

Impeachment and House Arrest

Peña’s removal from office was finalized by the Paraguayan Senate in a unanimous vote on Friday, October 6. The former president had attempted to submit his resignation prior to the trial, but the request was rejected, and the proceedings continued until the impeachment was approved.

Minutes after the Congressional decision, prosecutors specializing in economic crimes and anti-corruption efforts requested his immediate arrest. The Public Prosecutor’s Office subsequently ordered that he be placed under house arrest, citing Peña’s alleged involvement in the collapse of Ueno Bank.

This measure was merely the first step in the criminal prosecution.

Peña was summoned to appear before the prosecutor’s office on Saturday morning, October 7, at 11:00 a.m. local time for his first formal hearing in the case.

During this hearing, he is to be questioned over alleged crimes including breach of trust, influence peddling, and embezzlement. The speed with which the Public Prosecutor’s Office acted following his impeachment reflects the scale of the scandal and the political and social pressure that had mounted in the preceding days.

The Ueno Bank Scandal

The crisis was triggered by the closure of Ueno Bank on Tuesday, October 3, three days before the president’s impeachment. The Central Bank of Paraguay initiated liquidation proceedings for the institution after discovering a deficit in its solvency ratios, linked to loans granted to companies affiliated with the bank’s own controlling group.

The bank belonged to the Vázquez Group, in which Peña held shares until March of last year. The institution held approximately US$ 850 million in public deposits, including funds from the Social Security Institute, and served about 3 million clients. That is equivalent to nearly 40% of the Paraguayan population.

The opposition did not spare the former president. Lawmakers accused him of conflicts of interest, regulatory manipulation, the misappropriation of social security funds, and institutional cover-ups by the Central Bank.

“Never before has anyone harmed 3 million people in the Republic of Paraguay in a single day, yet you managed to do just that,” said opposition lawmaker Rocío Vallejo during a session, shortly before filing a formal accusation against Peña.

A protester, interviewed by Reuters outside the former president’s residence, summed up the sentiment on the streets.

“Overnight, people have been left going hungry,” he said. “People who can no longer even afford a bus fare. Why? Because of Santiago Peña and the entire Vázquez group.”

Peña’s legal status at the military unit, the Presidential Escort Regiment, remains unclear on several key points. As of the time of publication, there has been no confirmation that the judiciary or the Public Prosecutor’s Office formally authorized this change in the place of detention. Nor have the conditions under which the former president will be held at the military facility been disclosed.

His transfer to a unit tasked with the security of heads of state and former presidents, rather than to a standard prison, is a development that public pressure on the streets of Asunción had already signaled would fall short of the demand for accountability.

Paraguay Has a New President

The Paraguayan Congress has sworn in the former vice president, Pedro Alliana, as the new head of state. Alliana was spared from impeachment proceedings in the Chamber of Deputies, which allowed him to assume the presidency amidst the crisis.

Paraguay now faces the challenge of rebuilding institutional trust, as millions of account holders await the return of their frozen funds and criminal proceedings against Peña take their first formal steps.

This article was originally published by Revista Forum. It was translated by Panamerican Dispatch. You can read the original, in Portuguese, here.

I am not a political scientist, a field within the human sciences that I consider among the most complex, but I want to weigh in on the whirlwind we have been going through since October 4.1

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s epic comeback over the candidate of the corrupt and criminal far right will be the subject of study by these experts for a very long time to come, and will surely generate much debate.2 For me, however, one thing is indisputable: there was an uprising of civil society that made this David-versus-Goliath victory possible. A David who, incredibly, is President of the Republic and who, if everything were normal, should have been the Goliath in this story. But that is not the case.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s victory was a triumph over the mighty and omnipresent Big Tech companies, over the Big Brother of the North, the United States, and its dreadful president, Donald Trump, and over the neofascists who, unfortunately, keep gaining ground around the world and here too.3 It was a triumph over the most powerful material interests, which openly rooted for his defeat, and over the big corporate media, which gave the criminal, coup-plotting candidate a free pass, treating him as a “normal” candidate.

Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva raises a hand on stage during a “Women with Lula” campaign rally in Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais state, Brazil, on August 29, 2026. (Photo by Douglas MAGNO / AFP via Getty Images)

Lula’s victory was a triumph over the president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE)4, who was an avowed partisan of the other candidate and shamelessly campaigned for him, usurping the power institutionally granted to him, and also over sections of the state apparatus5 that played dirty, trying to prevent his likely voters from voting.

In the flood of commentary now pouring out to make sense of this epic saga, the streets and social media have appeared as indispensable protagonists. But the massive street demonstrations across the country were not scheduled by the campaign. They were not instigated by the Workers’ Party (PT) or by the parties of the coalition supporting the president’s re-election.

No! It was civil society that took to the streets, that was shaken by the prospect of the country plunging over a precipice, and that decided to react. It all began with a demonstration by students at the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF) in Niterói, the day after the first round, when the nightmare began. It was those young people who pulled the thread that began to weave the unlikely victory.

Congressman André Janones’s great idea of creating what he called “Lula’s army”6 to dominate social media, outmaneuver the biased algorithms, and achieve what the left had never managed before would have come to nothing had nearly 11 million Brazilian citizens not thrown themselves headlong into it.

But beyond the streets and social media, a myriad of entirely individual initiatives, coordinated by no one, began to spring up from all sides.

People who paid out of their own pockets to print thousands of pamphlets to hand out in various places, some of them showing the social achievements of the Lula government, in contrast to its horrible predecessor. Others exposed the countless crimes and shady dealings of the opposition candidate. Still others recalled the terrible years of the dictatorship and the loss of freedom that a far-right victory would represent.7

People who campaigned online tirelessly, working to win over undecided voters and those who had abstained in the first round8. People who, on election day itself, organized carpools to take elderly voters and others who would have trouble getting to the polling stations, voters who otherwise would not have voted for re-election.

Given all this, I believe Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s victory represents much more than the four additional years that Brazilians have given him to govern the country. And I say it means much more, not only because it spared Latin America a perilous near-unanimity of far-right governments9, which would have further increased Donald Trump’s power over our wealth and over democracy. Nor is it only because it symbolized a heavy defeat for the seemingly unstoppable rise of the far right around the world.

All of this is true. But the greatest value of this incredible victory, in my view, is that it runs resolutely counter to the deepest ideological currents of our time, in a world increasingly dominated by the values of the self-made individual, meritocracy, and rational individual action, a world in which each person looks out only for themselves, their own gain, their particular advantage, their private interests. This ideology, it should be said, is indispensable to the commodity form, and the endless torrent of technological novelties in the digital world only reinforces it.

This bleak world is the product of decades of neoliberalism and of the inequalities, injustices, and affronts to human dignity it has generated.

Against the “neoliberal subject,” in Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval’s terms, Brazil showed the world the beauty of the collective, the common, and the group, of the sense of community and the building of solidarities. It showed the pleasure of a victory that belongs to everyone. It reminded everyone of the joy, almost absent today, of feeling part of something that transcends us.

May the victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and of Brazil serve to change, however slightly, the grim panorama of this first quarter of the twenty-first century!

Leda Paulani is Professor Emerita of Economics at the University of São Paulo (USP). She is the author of, among other books, Modernidade e discurso econômico [Modernity and Economic Discourse] (Boitempo). This essay was originally published in the Brazilian online magazine A Terra é Redonda shortly after the second round of the 2026 presidential election in Brazil. This text was translated by Lygia Sabbag Fares and Pedro Henrique Evangelista Duarte. You can read the original article, in Portuguese, here.

Democratic Congressional Representatives Jesús “Chuy” García, Jonathan Jackson, and Greg Casar joined 10 colleagues in sending a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio to denounce the rising repression.

The members urged Secretary Rubio to “immediately suspend all U.S. security assistance and military cooperation with the Noboa administration until democracy and the rule of law are fully restored, and the persecution of González and other opposition figures and parties cease.”

The recent arrest of former presidential candidate Luisa González and the crackdown on other opposition officials and parties marks the latest alarming phase in Ecuador’s descent into de facto one-party rule by President Daniel Noboa and his allies.

Military officers ride in the back of a truck during a ceremony of the military change of command at Eloy Alfaro Military School on November 26, 2025 in Quito, Ecuador. (Photo by Franklin Jacome/Agencia Press South/Getty Images)

The letter outlines how under President Daniel Noboa, “Ecuador has seen the repression of opposition actors across the political spectrum, attacks on judicial independence, and restrictions on the freedom of the press.”

Other concerns expressed by the congressional representatives about the Noboa government include its undermining of the judiciary, a prolonged “state of emergency” under which Noboa has claimed extraordinary powers, restricted civil liberties and human rights violations. Among the abuses is torture, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and sexual abuse in women’s prisons.

The lawmakers warned Rubio that if the Trump Administration fails to take action to deter the Noboa government’s authoritarian actions, Congress will use the tools at its disposal to compel a change of policy in the United States.

They concluded, “The United States cannot credibly claim to support democracy and the fight against drug-trafficking and organized crime while at the same time expanding its security relationship with a government that is rapidly tightening its authoritarian grip on power.”

In addition to Representatives García, Jackson, and Casar, the letter was signed by: Representatives Jasmine Crockett, from Texas; Adelita Grijalva, from Arizona; Hank Johnson, from Georgia; Ro Khanna, from California; Summer Lee, from Pennsylvania; Eleanor Holmes Norton, from Washington DC; Delia Ramirez and Jan Schakowsky, from Illinois; Rashida Tlaib, from Michigan; and Nydia Velázquez, from New York.

A full copy of the letter can be found here.

Eight days before Paraguay’s Central Bank initiated resolution proceedings for Ueno Bank, the far-right production company Brasil Paralelo released a documentary about the advantages of moving to Paraguay. The video, entitled “Paraguay: The Unexpected Destination,” premiered the day after Flavio Bolsonaro lost the presidential election on Oct. 26. It featured Raúl Latorre, president of Paraguay’s Congress and a member of President Santiago Peña’s Colorado Party.

Screen shot of international bridge from documentary by Brasil Paralelo, which is known for its slickly produced, conspiracy-theory laden hit jobs against left wing politicians and political parties, encouraging Brazilians to immigrate to Paraguay

The program was part of a wave of content that presented Paraguay as an economic alternative to Brazil. Financial influencers, business owners and bolsonarista pages began promoting supposed lower taxes, industrial incentives and ease of relocating companies and assets to the neighboring country.

The activity drew attention after Ueno Bank collapsed on Nov. 3. The Central Bank of Paraguay placed the institution, which served about 3 million customers and held $350 million in retirement pensions into resolution proceedings after solvency ratio had fallen to less than half the required minimum.

Brasil Paralelo interviewed a leader of the ruling party

Brasil Paralelo made the documentary available for free on YouTube. It highlighted Brazilian business owners who moved their operations to Paraguay, families who decided to leave Brazil and the tax advantages the country offers.

Latorre was one of the people interviewed, as was confirmed in an official statement from Paraguay’s Congress published on Oct. 30th.

In his interview with journalist Bruno Musa, Latorre praised Paraguay’s economic model, the conservative values of the Colorado Party and spoke of opportunities for foreign investors. He also emphasized the government’s support for private property, legal certainty and entrepreneurship.

The documentary illustrates social issues and problems in Paraguay’s public services, but devotes much more space to the supposed economic advantages for Brazilian business owners.

A bolsonarista network promoted immigration to Paraguay

The promotion of Paraguay did not start with Brasil Paralelo.

In September, an investigation by the Paraguayan news outlet El Surti identified a network of Brazilian social media influencers who were encouraging people to immigrate to Paraguay and set up companies there.

El Surti analyzed four social media profiles: Conexão Política, Imigra Paraguai, Buenno and Vinicius Guimaraes. Together they had more than 3 million followers on Instagram.

Their posts linked Paraguay’s tax incentives to political conservatism, opposition to the government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and more flexible labor laws.

One of the people identified in the story is Davy Albuquerque de Fonseca, cofounder of the Conexão Política portal and CEO of Imigra Paraguai, a company that offers tax residency, immigration and business setup services for Brazilians to emigrate to the country.

In November 2025, the portal announced a partnership with the consulting firm to promote those services. One campaign presented Paraguay as a country that defends God, homeland, family and freedom.

Conexão Política promoted an event sponsored by Ueno Bank

A post from Aug. 30 links Ueno Bank advertising to the Brazilian network that promotes Paraguay.

That day, Conexão Política published content about the WRC Ueno Rally del Paraguay, an auto race sponsored by the bank. The post identified Imigra Paraguai as a partner of the portal. It offered the consultancy’s services to Brazilians interested in investing in or buying property in Paraguay.

The content combines the Ueno Bank brand with commercial promotion by the Brazilian consulting firm. It does not prove, however, that the bank hired or paid the portal for the post.

Primo Rico, Bruno Perini among influencers who promoted Paraguay

The promotion of Paraguay’s economic advantages also reached influencers with large audiences in Brazil.

Thiago Nigro, known as Primo Rico (Rich Cousin), published a video entitled “The Flight of Brazilians to Paraguay.” In it, he discussed the transfer of companies, industrial incentives and reduced taxes. The video also carried an ad for Mercado Bitcoin.

Bruno Perini published price and tax comparisons between the two countries. In September, he highlighted differences in the prices of cars made in Brazil and sold in Paraguay. He attributed part of the difference to taxes.

Luciano Hang, a former major campaign donor and close ally of Jair Bolsonaro who owns the Havan box store chain, visited Asunción in July and met with Peña. Hang said he was studying an expansion of his business to Paraguay.

Other names involved in promoting Paraguay’s economic opportunities are Rob Correa, the Gêmeos Investem channel and Luciano Campos of Inteligência Empresarial. Their content covers taxes, tax residency, setting up factories and opening companies.

Not every YouTuber joined the trend. Filipe Boni published a video titled “The REAL Reason Brazilians Are Fleeing to Paraguay, Explained.” In it, he criticizes Brazilians who leave for the neighboring country, drawn by the promise of economic advantages.

In the El Surti investigation, influencer João Buenno also appears among those promoting Paraguay’s advantages. Guimaraes was interviewed and denied that he advocates weakening labor laws.

Ueno Bank confirms use of influencers

Ueno Bank included influencers in its advertising strategy. The agency 23 Sports was responsible for the “Todo por ganar” (Everything to win) campaign. Its portfolio lists the channels used to promote the institution while Paraguay prepared for the 2026 World Cup. Besides television, radio, print, outdoor advertising and digital platforms, the agency expressly lists influencers as an advertising category.

The record is available on the official 23 Sports website. The page does not identify the influencers involved or mention contracts with Brazilians.

Bank sponsored an event with Eduardo Bolsonaro in the United States

Ueno Bank also sponsored events for the international far right. It was a sponsor of the Hispanic Prosperity Gala on Feb. 10, 2026, at President Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago club in Florida. Among the prominent actors of the Latin American far right in attendance were Eduardo Bolsonaro and Argentine political consultant Fernando Cerimedo, who is currently in jail in Bolivia for attempting to murder his pregnant girlfriend. Ueno Bank appeared among the sponsors in the Diamond category, which the organizers offered for a minimum of $100,000. The amount the bank actually paid was not disclosed.

The Central Bank of Paraguay began resolution proceedings for Ueno Bank on Nov. 3 after finding that its financial position had deteriorated.

The agency hired by the bank documented the campaigns with influencers. There is no proof, however, that Ueno Bank paid the Brazilians who promoted immigration to Paraguay.

This article originally appeared in Revista Fórum, was translated with express authorization of the editor-in-chief by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

The Brazilian government views the fall of Paraguayan President Santiago Peña as another defeat for Latin American leaders who bet everything on political alignment with the United States.

The Lula administration has no interest in instability in a neighboring country. Likewise, it has no illusions that leftist forces could govern Paraguay in the near future. One concern is that the crisis could take on social proportions. After all, a bank that reportedly held the savings and pensions of nearly half of the country’s population has collapsed.

(Photo: Social Media)

The urgency, therefore, is to avoid political chaos. Brazil is expected to appeal in the coming hours for calm to be restored.

Still, sources in Brasília said the government in Asunción had adopted the “complete recipe” of submission to American interests.

In recent years, Peña authorized a military agreement with President Donald Trump that called for the possible creation of a foreign base in the country. Paraguay also signed pacts allowing American companies based there to use free energy from the Itaipú hydroelectric plant. It also signed investment agreements and deals for foreign exploitation of natural resources.

Under Peña, Paraguay nominated itself as a candidate to lead the Organization of American States (OAS). It officially recognizes Taiwan, and has voted with the United States on unpopular measures at the United Nations.

Despite a possible ideological shift in Paraguay, Brazil does not yet expect a progressive wave in the region. The Brazilian government believes that disputes with the far right will last for years, both in Brazil and across the region.

However, it is well known that far right governments in the region are suffering drops in popularity and turbulence.

Part of the strategy for a new Lula term in 2027 is to revive integration projects that interest both the right and the left.

The Brazilian government plans to persuade other governments in the region to join a project of “possible integration.” It would rest on pragmatism, even among governments with deeply divergent ideologies.

One topic to explore would be cooperation on public security. Lula is also expected to step up meetings with South American heads of state. He hopes to send clear signals that he wants to resume the process of rapprochement.

Brazil has not ruled out inviting Venezuelan officials or making bilateral visits.

This article first appeared in ICL Notícias, was translated with express authorization from its editor by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

Paraguay’s Ueno Bank was one of the primary sponsors of an international right-wing event in the United States that featured Eduardo Bolsonaro.

That bank is currently undergoing closure following a solvency crisis, which has unleashed a wave of protests and the resignation of President Santiago Peña.

Ueno Bank's connection to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago gala was brought to light by Brazilian lawmaker Alencar Santana, from the Workers’ Party. It appears in records from the ceremony, which was held at Donald Trump’s Mar-a-Lago club in Florida.

Eduardo Bolsonaro speaks next to an image of his father, during the CPAC Argentina 2024 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. (Photo by Tomas Cuesta/Getty Images)

In a post on Wednesday, November 4, Alencar said that he had presented the case to Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies’ Committee on Foreign Relations. The lawmaker pointed out that the financial institution, now under intervention by the Central Bank of Paraguay, had allocated funds to sponsor the gathering of international conservative leaders.

The event in Mar-a-Lago took place on February 10, 2026. Photographs show Eduardo Bolsonaro standing in front of a backdrop featuring the Ueno Bank logo. The bank was listed as a “Diamond” level sponsor for the “Hispanic Prosperity Gala,” organized by the platform Latino Wall Street.

Ueno Bank Sponsored a Gathering with Eduardo Bolsonaro at Trump’s Club

The ceremony brought together business leaders, political figures, and representatives of the Latin American right at Mar-a-Lago, Donald Trump’s property in Palm Beach. Eduardo Bolsonaro attended in person. Argentine President Javier Milei, who had been announced as a guest, sent a recorded message.

Ueno Bank was one of six “Diamond” sponsors, a tier above the “Gold” and “Silver” categories. According to a schedule released by the organizers, the “Diamond” sponsorship package was priced at $100,000. The amount paid by the Paraguayan institution was not disclosed.

Eduardo Bolsonaro also took part in honoring Argentine political consultant Fernando Cerimedo, who is known for spreading baseless allegations of fraud over the 2022 Brazilian elections.

A huge scandal broke around Cerimedo in August, this year, after he was arrested in Bolivia on charges of attempting to kill his pregnant ex-girlfriend, Nadia Beller. She survived three gunshot wounds and spoke to press about Cerimedo’s role in underhanded political dealings across Latin America, and connections to far-right politicians and even the White House

At the Mar-a-Lago ceremony, in February, Eduardo presented Cerimedo with an award for “Hispanic Political Consultant of the Year.” The Brazilian news outlet Revista Fórum has previously documented Cerimedo’s international activities, his ties to the political movement surrounding the Bolsonaro family, and his coordination with political operatives linked to U.S. President Donald Trump.

The Bank with Ties to Former Business Associates of the Paraguayan President Has Collapsed.

The crisis at Ueno Bank became public on November 3, when the Central Bank of Paraguay announced its intervention in the institution. The decision had been approved unanimously the previous day, following the discovery that the bank’s solvency ratio had fallen below 50% of the legally required minimum.

The bank resolution process resulted in the suspension of operations, transfers, and access to people’s accounts. Roughly 3 million customers have been affected, leading to long lines at bank branches and protests by depositors concerned about the recovery of their savings.

The institution managed between $800 million and $850 million in Paraguayan public funds. Of this total, roughly $380 million belonged to Paraguay’s Social Welfare Institute, IPS, which is responsible for pensions and healthcare services.

The bank’s primary shareholder is the Vázquez Group, a business conglomerate that maintained corporate ties with Paraguayan President Santiago Peña until March 2025. The growth in deposits from public institutions at Ueno had already been a subject of concern among the opposition and experts within the country.

The crisis has also impacted the institution’s leadership. Paraguayan authorities have ordered the arrest of eight individuals, including bank executives, as part of an investigation into suspected financial irregularities.

Millions of Clients Are Awaiting the Return Funds

The Central Bank of Paraguay has officially stated that deposits are guaranteed up to 228.3 million guaranis per account holder. That is approximately US$38,000, per individual. Preliminary estimates suggest that this coverage will fully protect about 97% of depositors.

On Wednesday, November 4, the country’s monetary authority announced a mechanism for advance payments of up to 40 Paraguayan minimum wages per client. That is the equivalent of 121.76 million guaranis, or roughly $20,000, minus any outstanding debts owed to the institution. The process was scheduled to begin this Thursday, November 5

The scandal has triggered a political crisis for the administration of Santiago Peña, leading to calls for an investigation, demands for the recovery of public funds, and demonstrations in favor of initiating impeachment proceedings.

Ueno Bank Sponsorship Raises Further Questions Over International Relations

The participation of Ueno Bank in the Mar-a-Lago gala has placed further attention on the spending of a financial institution that managed hundreds of millions of dollars in public funds.

This article was originally published by Revista Forum. It was translated by Panamerican Dispatch. You can read the original, in Portuguese, here.

Janine Jackson: Welcome to Counterspin, your weekly look behind the headlines. I’m Janine Jackson. This week on Counterspin, you can smell what U.S. corporate press are cooking with the New York Times headline that the victory of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was a blow to Brazil’s right.

Lula on the campaign trail in Belo Horizonte in October, 2026 (Photo: Ricardo Stuckert)

Would you feel differently if the New York Times in their headline called Lula’s victory a win for Brazil’s poor and elderly and working people? Based on their record, the Times imagines and expects that you would. We’ll talk about Lula’s win and why your corporate news outlet might tell you to fear it with Brian Mier. He’s an editor at Pan American Dispatch and Brazil correspondent for Telesor English.

He didn’t parachute in, he’s lived in Brazil for decades. We’ll hear from him today on Counterspin. That’s what’s coming up.

“We don’t want dictatorship. We don’t want hatred. We don’t want guns.

We want a country of love.” So said Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on the night before his electoral victory over Flavio Bolsonaro, who has subsequently fled the country and been granted asylum immediately in the U.S., because, of course. I found that quote in The New Republic and The Guardian, but most of U.S. corporate media ignored it in favor of hand-wringing like in CNBC’s article, “Lula’s election win leaves Brazil facing a fiscal tightrope.”

That article included the observations that his victory, “wiped out a rally in Brazilian assets that followed Flavio Bolsonaro, seen as the more market-friendly and fiscally disciplined of the candidates.”

And it added a familiar warning, “Lula has promised expensive measures that appeal to his grassroots base.” We can expect more of this going forward, but U.S. media certainly won’t be the only headwind that Lula will face.

Still, his victory has brought relief and maybe even a little hope to millions of people in Brazil and around the world. Brian Mier is an editor at Pan American Dispatch and Brazil correspondent for Telesor English. He joins us now by phone from Recife.

Welcome back to Counterspin.

Brian Mier: Thanks for having me.

Jackson: Well, listeners will know that the race was tight down to the wire and that Bolsonaro had won the first round and evidently the runner-up winning the second round hasn’t happened for decades.

And I just want to ask you first, where were you when the results were announced and what was that energy like?

Mier: Well, I was so stressed out about the election that I just sat in a restaurant that didn’t have a TV with a buddy of mine. We were just checking our phones sporadically and we started hearing screams from the streets. And then when the tally got up to about 80 percent, it was pretty much guaranteed that Lula had it and people were just running around screaming.

We got on the subway and headed up to Paulista Avenue. The subway itself was like a carnival ride, full of hundreds of people in red, singing and chanting for Lula. And we arrived on Paulista Avenue where an estimated crowd of one million came out for the victory celebration. And it was pretty intense. It was pretty big. It was a lot bigger than 2022.

Jackson: Well, I’m reading that the difference between the first round and the decisive round had to do with young voters in particular, but also in just increased turnout.

Mier: Yeah, well regarding the strategy... I wrote an article called Glimmers of Hope from Brazil’s 2026 election two days after the first round. It wasn’t as bad as people were portraying it.

Basically, there was a two point margin of error and polls had them pretty tying and Bolsonaro won by 1.8 percent. But basically, the PT party, the Workers’ Party analysis was that they would have a much better chance targeting people who didn’t vote in the first round than trying to change the minds of Bolsonaro fanatics. And so that’s what they focused on.

And they focused on it in two different ways. At the grassroots level, the way they always do - the old fashioned way, because it’s a party founded by labor union organizers - which is knocking on doors, talking to people at bus stops, handing out pamphlets on the street, talking to your relatives, getting older relatives to come out and vote because voting is optional for people over 70 in Brazil. A big untold story is just the massive amount of senior citizens who remember the dictatorship, who didn’t go out and vote in the first round because they thought Lula was going to win anyway who put on red, got in their wheelchairs, got wheeled to the polling stations. There were people in their 90s with their canes coming out to vote for Lula. So in the end, 14 million more people voted in the second round than the first round. Of those 14 million, 10.3 million voted for Lula and 3.7 voted for Bolsonaro.

Jackson: So it was a good strategy and it worked. I saw that AP said that the victory depended on younger, older and working class voters. And I thought, well, who else is there? I don’t want to underestimate the difficulties that Lula faces now, you know, besides these financial pressures and, you know, congressional hostility.

But what would you say are the biggest kind of obstacles within Brazil itself and the region? We’ll get to the U.S. in a second, but what is he confronting out of the gate?

Mier: Well, you see the way the Western media is portraying him as being fiscally irresponsible, as all leftists are, according to their 19th century, liberal doctrine of fiscal responsibility a la Margaret Thatcher. But the fact is, there’s massive climate change related weather disasters that have to be prepared for and the risks have to be mitigated. And this costs money in terms of fiscal responsibility.

When Lula took office the first time, Brazil only had $50 billion in foreign reserves. By the time Dilma Rousseff was impeached, the Workers’ Party had amassed $360 billion in foreign reserves. So they’re not a fiscally irresponsible party.

And the amount of debt that Brazil is in is much lower as percentage of GDP as the United States, for example. The economic issues are not the real problem. The problems facing Brazil, I think, are climate related.

They’re related to the wave of conservatism spreading across Latin America, animosity from neighboring Argentina that’s working very closely with Trump, future animosity from the Trump administration or the U.S. government. And, you know, just being able to govern with a very right-wing Congress, a lot of people are exaggerating how hard that’s going to be because they don’t know the history of how Congress works in Brazil. But even at the height of Lula’s popularity in the 2000s, the Workers’ Party never had more than 24 percent of the seats in Congress.

Currently, after the last election, it has about 18 percent But Lula has never governed in a situation in which Congress wasn’t dominated by right-wing political parties. And he’s been pretty good at stitching together workable coalitions that enabled him to push things through, like the constitutional amendment that he just spent four years working on that reduced Brazil’s work week from five and a half days a week to five days a week, which was a historic victory that people have been working towards for decades.

But that being said, there are challenges in that, for example, you see people like Glenn Greenwald, people who read Glenn Greenwald and listen to Glenn Greenwald and a series of New York Times articles trying to portray Brazil as this country that’s dangerously veering towards authoritarianism.

But the fact of the matter is Jair Bolsonaro’s wife was just elected to Senate. Jair Bolsonaro’s third son Carlos was just elected to Senate. The man who oversaw the kangaroo court procedure that culminated in Lula’s arbitrary imprisonment with no crime committed in 2018, Sergio Moro, was just elected governor of Paraná State.

So he is going to have some headaches from these people, you know, from Bolsonaro’s allies. Some of them are going to switch over to Lula’s coalition, but some of them are going to continue to give headaches to the government.

Jackson: Well, Trump, of course, was out in front crying corruption. That’s no surprise. And then inventing new asylum rules that would allow Flavio Bolsonaro to just slide right in. Now I’m reading in The New Republic about kind of behind the scenes, State Department meddling, asking diplomats in Brazil to do everything possible to undermine Lula.

What can we expect in terms of Brazil-U.S. relations, and how much does or should that matter?

Mier: It should definitely matter because the U.S. has a long history of intervening and propping up neo-fascist dictatorships and far right-wing authoritarian leaders in all of Latin America. And traditionally, as laid out by Philip Agee in The CIA Diaries, which is a great book from the 1970s, the State Department will first hope that their candidate can win an election in Latin America in a free and fair election. If that doesn’t look like it’s going to work, they start interfering in the election to prop up their candidate, which is what just happened in Brazil.

If that doesn’t work, historically the next step would be to try and foment some kind of coup d’etat. And we saw this happen in Brazil in 2014, when the Democratic Party was gunning for Aecio Neves, an extremely corrupt neoliberal who used tax money to build a private airport on his uncle’s ranch. He was involved in all kinds of corruption scandals, but they looked the other way.

When he lost the election against Dilma Rousseff, he immediately refused to recognize the results. He called for an audit of the votes, which happened and confirmed Dilma’s victory. And then they paralyzed Congress so that President Rousseff could get nothing done.

The fact of the matter is that Lula is a more savvy politician than Dilma Rousseff. I don’t think he’s going to have that problem. But that’s when they started the whole anti-corruption witch hunt called Lava Jato, or Operation Car Wash, which was a collaboration between the U.S. Department of Justice, the FBI, and this Curitiba public prosecutor’s office in a case overseen by this judge who was just elected to be governor of Paraná. And the New York Times gave an entire investigation, glowing coverage, and that process contributed to Dilma Rousseff’s illegitimate impeachment. So that’s the most recent time that the U.S. has stepped in to overthrow Brazil when it wasn’t happy with the election result. In this case, I think it’s going to be a little bit different. Because it looks like Trump is already backing off in his support for Flavio Bolsonaro. I think in Trump’s mind, he’s got this mental list in his head, that tiny brain of his, in which he categorizes people in binary fashion. They’re either winners or losers.

And he doesn’t want to be around losers. And I think in his mind, Flavio Bolsonaro is now a loser. Right? So even though Marco Rubio and other people in the Trump administration might be trying to help Flavio Bolsonaro, I don’t think Trump is on board with it.

And I think that if the Democrats win the majority in Congress, it’s going to create a bunch of headaches for Trump’s plans in Brazil as well, because the Bolsonaros made the very foolish move of completely siding with one political party in the United States. At first, the Biden administration seems happy to work with Jair Bolsonaro. But then when a very good group of Democratic lawmakers, about 30 of them, at the time led by Hank Johnson from Georgia, they managed to convince the rest of the party that really the closeness between Bolsonaro and Trump was bad for the Democratic Party.

And so when Bolsonaro started trying to set up the coup, apparently, from what I know from Brazilian media sources, he sent an emissary to ask for help holding an autocoup to the Biden administration. And the Biden administration said no. And so I think now, because of so much public association between Bolsonaro and Trump, if the Democrats take control of Congress, they’re going to look the other way at some of Lula’s effective social policies, which the corporate Democrats seem to hate, like increasing funding for the free universal public health system and free university tuition.

And they’re going to at least try to cause some problems for Trump’s imperialist Donroe doctrine ambitions for Brazil.

Jackson: I want to tell folks that you wrote about what you described as the long coup and US media’s involvement in that, meaning that time between the 2014 Dilma Rousseff impeachment, and 2019. And folks can look at FAIR.org for your 2023 piece on that.

But what I want to lift up from that is your quote, “for over half a century, intervening against democratically elected governments has been only half the story. The second half involves justifying, minimizing or denying US involvement.” And I think that’s where news media come in, right?

Mier: Not just denying, but gaslighting journalists who try to talk about it.

There’s an industry of denying the coup, but they don’t just stop at denying the coup. They try and destroy the careers of journalists who talk about it. Look at what happened to Gary Webb.

Jackson: Well, we hear now from Paul Krugman, moving on to media, we hear from Paul Krugman that Meta, unsurprisingly, frankly, was doing some meddling, you know, hobbling Lula’s account and promoting Bolsonaro’s. That’s kind of par for the course.

But I understand that social media also played a positive role, such that people are asking, can they dress up for Halloween as cyber Lula?

Mier: This was really interesting because of something said by Nadia Geller, the ex-girlfriend of Fernando Cerimedo, who is kind of cyber bag man for the international far right in Latin America. He was involved in generating thousands of deep fake AI images in the Colombian election, from a bot farm based out of Argentina and is very close to Javier Milei. He was arrested for attempting to murder Nadia Beller, a Bolivian lawyer who was pregnent at the time. She survived and went on the Mexican television network Channel 14 and gave an interview saying that Fernando had told her that he and Eduardo Bolsonaro, Flavio’s brother, had gone to Meta headquarters in California and negotiated a deal for supporting the Flavio Bolsonaro campaign by boosting its algorithm and damaging the Lula campaign. And that seemed to be what was actually happening, as the two candidates had pretty much equal reach until about 12 hours before the first round election.

And then suddenly Lula’s reach remained the same and Flavio suddenly had like five or six times more reach than Lula, even though he had less followers. And so then a bunch of Brazilian journalists did some really good work and people started testing its Meta AI and it was refusing to design campaign logos for Lula but designing them for Flavio.

The Supreme Court ordered Meta to provide equal reach for both candidates. Amnesty International and Eko both tested its system of monitoring and proved that it was very easy to take illegal campaign ads out from outside of Brazil—that’s a crime in Brazil—and also to use them to present disinformation that made it past Meta’s content moderation, right? So the Supreme Court ordered Meta to stop allowing that to happen and to provide equal reach, no pushing for either candidate’s reach. And Meta initially ignored the court order.

Then protests started happening. Then it started reaching the international media. Protests happened in London, Ireland in front of Meta’s headquarters in Sao Paulo.

And it looks like by the end, the final week before the election, Meta made some kind of decision that it was too damaging to their reputation to continue favoring Flavio Bolsonaro in reach. And the Lula campaign ended up surpassing Flavio’s reach by like 400 percent. And part of this is because of a really great congressman named Andres Janonez.

I say great. I mean, he’s just really smart and is from the working class.

He came up with this idea to bypass Meta’s algorithms by creating this WhatsApp group and asking everybody to get everyone they knew to sign up to it. And by a couple of days before the election, he had 10 million followers in a group that was only a few weeks old. And every day, he’s just coming on every hour, just yelling at the camera, sending his videos out, yelling, “nobody sleep, nobody eat, we can’t do anything until the danger of return to dictatorship is permanently vanquished from our country.”

And people starting sharing the stuff around. He would say, “go to this site, use this hashtag. If you have a friend who doesn’t know who to vote for, send them this article.” Every hour he would give out instructions like that. And it worked. It’s pretty incredible. And now leftist political parties around the world are asking him for help.

Jackson: I wish we had more time, but I just want to say I did notice some US press with an unsurprising emphasis, even within some ostensibly respectful coverage, but an emphasis that Lula has over promised, like leftists do, you know, but he won’t be able to deliver. And it sounds like a threat, frankly, but I just wonder what you would have listeners take away in terms of what you’re going to see in US news media about Lula and what antidote should you take with that?

Mier: Yeah, it’s funny. This criticism of Lula has seeped into a lot of leftist commentary as well, as if he didn’t really do anything for the last four years. He ended hunger. He took Brazil back off the UN’s world hunger map.

He pushed through annual above inflation minimum salary raises. He lowered the work week with no pay reduction for anyone, through a constitutional amendment. He ended a genocide that was underway against the Yanomami people in the Amazon, committed by illegal gold miners that had been encouraged by Bolsonaro to move into the area.

He reduced the Amazon rainforest destruction by 79 percent, trippled funding on renewable energy, rebuilt the public university system and built new universities. But they don’t report on any of this. So he’ll keep keeping his campaign promises, and the Northern media will just pretend he’s not doing anything, because a lot of the policies are too complicated to explain in soundbites anyway.

But it’s frustrating because I’ve seen people, even on the Facebook page of a frequent Fair contributor, arguing that Lula hadn’t done anything in the last four years. You could just do some research and find out what they’re actually doing.

And you’d be surprised. I mean, he promised to make online gambling illegal if he were re-elected, and then he just went ahead and did it anyway before the election. He’s done a very good job in three different presidential terms of working around a right-wing Congress and managing to make structural adjustments that have significantly increased the quality of life for Brazil’s large working class.

When he first took office in 2003, only 4% of the students in Brazil’s public university system - which is still tuition-free even though Bolsonaro tried to start charging for it - came from the primarily Afro-Brazilian working class. The PT, the Workers’ Party, set up an improvement over the US affirmative action system that’s locked into social class. So a requirement is that you have to have studied in public schools and come from a family that makes less than two times the minimum wage.

Today, 52% of the university population of the student body in the nationwide public university system is Afro-Brazilian and working class. And these were the young people who came out in massive numbers on the streets for Lula to protect the rights that they have earned, that they’ve won in the last 25 years, that the Bolsonaros, the US international imperialist class want to remove. Flavio Bolsonaro was promising to defund the public university system because he couldn’t end affirmative action because it would be electorally impossible. So he was promising a backdoor strategy, transferring the public university system out of the Ministry of Education into the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Science and Technology. And that would have removed it from the constitutional requirement of funding earmarked from a certain percentage of income tax money every year.

It would have resulted in massive defunding for the entire system. So since it’s impossible for them to end the affirmative action, their plan was to destroy the system and then say they have to start charging for tuition so that it would transform back into an elite priveldge which is what it was like before Lula first took office in 2003. That’s just one example.

Jackson: I will just say the idea that folks will pay attention to Brazil and learn something from it, I understand why some people are afraid of that.

So just finally, we understand the hope and the fear that is coming out of this victory.

Mier: Yes. But I think that if you look at both the hope and the fear, the hope has definitely beaten the fear. And if anything, people are going to remain vigilant to protect their rights and their government more than ever right now from U.S. incursion.

I don’t know to what depths the United States government will go this time around to try and destroy Lula, which they’ve been working on for decades. But I feel like he’s in a stronger position now than he has been for the last four years. I mean, it was a massive victory.

If it weren’t for Meta, he would have won by 10 million votes.

Jackson: Exactly. And what I mean is I think that some people will be afraid that the involvement in Brazil means that, oh, maybe people will get an idea that people can fight for people.

And we don’t want that, you know. So I think we can expect from media a kind of dampening, dampening down, because heaven forbid, people take a lesson that you can have a bottom up victory the way that we had in Brazil.

Mier: It’s true. They would much rather have someone like Gabriel Boric in Chile, who just was like a lifestyle leftist, who didn’t do anything economically than have someone who might say inappropriate things now and again, and might not be very modern, but does a lot of transformative policies to improve the life of the working class at the expense of big business, redistribution and things like that.

Jackson: Alright, well, we will end it there. But we’re going to have future conversations.

We’ve been speaking with Brian Mier. He’s an editor at Pan American Dispatch and Brazil correspondent for Telesur English. Thank you so much for joining us this week on Counterspin.

A São Paulo court has ordered Meta to stop using material produced by Brazilian news organizations without their permission. The ruling came Tuesday, after a lawsuit was filed by a coalition of associations that represent newspapers, news magazines, radio and television broadcasters.

(Photo: Marcello Casal Jr/Agência Brasil)

The order bars Meta from using articles, images and videos published by news outlets without their consent. Meta owns Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp and Threads. The ruling also protects the outlets from penalties if they refuse Meta’s new requirements.

The National Association of Newspapers (ANJ), the Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters (ABERT) and the National Association of Magazine Publishers (ANER) filed the lawsuit.

The groups challenged changes to Meta’s commercial terms. Under those changes, outlets would have to let Meta access the content on their own websites. Meta’s automated systems would be able to view, copy, store and process the material. Meta wanted to use that archive to train and feed its artificial intelligence. The new rules were set to take effect Nov. 20.

Meta cannot restrict outlets’ pages

The ruling also bars Meta from blocking or limiting the accounts, pages and tools of the outlets that the associations represent. Meta cannot sanction any outlet that rejects the commercial terms challenged in the lawsuit.

Judge Guilherme Madeira Dezem of São Paulo’s 44th Civil Court set a fine of R$1 million (about $183,000) per day if Meta disobeys the order. The accumulated fine could reach R$100 million (about $18.3 million).

Dezem said Meta has had difficulty complying with court rulings in other cases. He said the large fine is necessary because of Meta’s history of resisting court orders.

The preliminary injunction suspends Meta’s requirement that outlets grant permission to use their journalism in order to stay on its platforms.

Associations challenge use of press content

The associations said Meta’s proposed changes threatened outlets’ copyright protection and widened the imbalance between digital platforms and the companies that actually produce news.

They said news reports and other journalistic material result from professional work and investment by news organizations. They said technology companies must therefore respect the rights of those producers when they access and use the content.

In a joint statement, ANJ, ABERT and ANER said the ruling is important for protecting intellectual property and the economic conditions needed to sustain professional journalism.

Meta said it would not comment on the ruling.

This article first appeared in TVT News, was translated to English by Panamerican Dispatch with express authorization from its editor, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

The sudden collapse of Paraguay’s Ueno Bank has triggered an unprecedented shockwave, paralyzing the country’s economy. The digital bank was the processor of roughly two-thirds of all electronic transactions at retail establishments across the country. It saw its operations abruptly shut down, leaving the commercial sector in a state of near-paralysis and plunging the population into a climate of despair and uncertainty over the fate of their finances.

The collapse occurred in the early hours of Tuesday, October 3, when the Central Bank of Paraguay ordered an intervention and the closure of the bank, initiating a liquidation process after identifying a severe solvency crisis. Audited financial statements revealed that the institution’s capitalization ratio had fallen to less than half of the minimum required by national regulations.

Ueno Bank depositors demonstrate in front of police officers during a protest following the intervention of the bank by Paraguay’s Central Bank in Asuncion on November 3, 2026. (Photo by DANIEL DUARTE / AFP via Getty Images)

The authorities’ response was immediate: the Paraguayan Public Prosecutor’s Office launched a criminal investigation into the bank’s leadership and issued arrest warrants for at least eight executives linked to the controlling entity, the Vázquez Group, including the chairman of the board, Miguel Vázquez.

The crisis has even reached the national political sphere, refocusing attention on Paraguayan President Santiago Peña, who was previously an investor in Ueno Bank’s holding company before selling his stake in March 2025.

Retail Paralysis and Daily Chaos for the Population

With the immediate suspension of all Ueno Bank operations, the impact on the country’s streets has been devastating. The bank had become the backbone of digital payments in Paraguay, amassing over 2.9 million account holders in a nation of approximately 6.1 million people. It was processing more than three million transactions daily.

The service disruption brought about 70% of retail and import-sector sales to a standstill. Unable to process card payments or transfers linked to the digital banks’s app, merchants saw their sale volume collapse, while thousands of citizens found themselves unable to carry out basic daily tasks, like paying for public transport, buying groceries, settling rent, or covering university tuition.

The social crisis is compounded by the impact on vulnerable groups. more than 32,000 retirees used the financial institution to receive their monthly social security benefits from the Social Welfare Institute, IPS, Paraguay’s social security agency.

Panic in the Streets, Tension, and Loss of Faith in the Social Security System

The inability to access one’s own funds, indicated only by error messages on mobile apps, led to growing crowds and protests outside shuttered branches in Asunción, Ciudad del Este, and various towns across the country.

In Ñemby, in the capital’s metropolitan area, the mounting tension culminated in one desperate customer smashing the glass door of a branch while seeking information. Faced with the risk of civil unrest, the National Police placed their forces on high alert and bolstered security around all of the financial institution’s locations nationwide.

The crisis at Ueno Bank has also sounded a red alert over the future of the public social security system. The IPS has approximately US$ 300 million invested or deposited with the liquidated institution, sparking deep concern among the working class that the loss of these assets could compromise the financial sustainability of the pension fund for decades to come.

Promises of Reimbursement and the Erosion of Credibility

To contain widespread panic and prevent a domino effect, the Central Bank of Paraguay was quick to characterize the episode as an isolated event, asserting that the rest of the banking system remains sound. The monetary authority stated that about 97% of account holders have balances covered by the Deposit Guarantee Fund, which ensures the return of up to 228 million guaranis, approximately US$ 37,400 per client.

However, the state guarantee sets a timeframe of up to 15 days for the funds to begin being settled and returned to account holders. For families and small business owners who relied on their daily balances to survive and keep their businesses running, a two-week wait represents an unsustainable gap. The episode has shattered the credibility of digital banks in the country, leaving behind a large number of clients determined to move their funds to traditional institutions as soon as their money is recovered.

This article was originally published by Revista Forum. It was translated by Panamerican Dispatch. You can read the original, in Portuguese, here.

President Donald Trump’s crushing defeat in the U.S. midterm elections and President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s historic victory in Brazil mean much more than two election results. They send an enormous political message to the world. In the two largest and most important countries in the Americas, voters are saying they do not accept a unipolar world order. They reject the ideology of white supremacy. They say no to political projects that turn immigrants into enemies by persecuting them, criminalizing them and denying them fundamental rights.

Texans celebrate the gubernatorial victory of Gina Hinojosa (Joel Angel Juarez/Getty Images)

But the message is broader. People want peace. They want an end to wars, military threats and unilateral sanctions that undermine free trade and relations among nations. They want a world where dialogue and diplomacy prevail over force, intimidation and one power imposing its interests on all others.

The results are also excellent news for the United Nations, which Trump’s foreign policy has treated with contempt. The UN now has a chance to regain a leading role. It can advance the reforms needed to play a truly central part in building a new international order. That order would be more democratic, multipolar and committed to peace, the sovereignty of peoples and cooperation among nations.

Another phenomenon is even more significant. A wave of popular mobilization is growing in Brazil, the United States and several European countries. It brings together young people, workers and broad sectors of society. Street demonstrations have outpaced traditional parties and political leaders, and often their ability to respond. The rise of autocratic governments and projects, threats to democratic freedoms and attacks on social rights are putting crowds in the streets around the world.

This reaction crosses borders and party ideologies. It puts popular participation back at the center of the fight over the future of democracy.

In Latin America, the hope is that this wave of democratic resistance will also halt the advance of governments unconditionally aligned with Trump. A string of electoral victories for the far right in the region came with a political influence operation by Washington, led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The United States gave financial, diplomatic and electoral support to conservative candidates. The strategy went as far as the direct use of military force in the Caribbean, culminating in the operation against Venezuela. It is a new version of the long history of U.S. intervention in Latin America. That policy now faces signs of resistance. It may begin to lose strength as the shifts seen at the ballot box and in the streets take hold.

More than a reaction to the rise of the far right, what is taking shape at the ballot box and in the streets is a fight over the future of humanity. That future cannot belong to autocrats, warlords and those who own the money. It must belong to the people.

Florestan Fernandes Jr is editor of the nightly web TV program, Boa Noite 247, and has worked for many of the largest media outlets in Brazil, including Folha de São Paulo, Jornal da Tarde, TV Globo, TV Manchete, TV Cultura, TV Gazeta, and TV Brasil. He is also a member of Brasil 247’s board of directors.

This article, which does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Panamerican Dispatch, originally appeared in Brasil 247, was translated with express authorization of its editor-in-chief, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

In just 10 days, two events of enormous political significance may have marked a historic turning point. In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro. That ended the possibility of the far right returning to power. In the United States, President Donald Trump suffered a major defeat in the midterm elections, losing control of the House and Senate to the Democrats.

Both results suggest that the political wave represented by MAGA, Trumpism and Bolsonarism may have reached its limits. Hate speech, the exploitation of social divisions and aggressive nationalism no longer appear enough to secure electoral victories.

Trump’s defeat is especially significant. He promised prosperity and peace. He delivered inflation, higher fuel prices and a war against Iran. American voters have begun to hold him accountable for the gap between his promises and reality.

Texas democrats celebrate senate victory ofJames Talarico (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Lula’s victory has an international dimension. It represents a stronger Global South, multipolarity and the sovereignty of peoples in the face of Washington’s hegemonic ambitions. It is also a victory for humanist values over predatory capitalism, extreme concentration of wealth and the logic of endless wars.

Lula showed that it is possible to confront the far right with a project built on social inclusion, democracy and international cooperation. His reelection strengthens the BRICS and expands the possibilities of building a more balanced world order.

Trump’s weakening is likely to have consequences across Latin America. One of the leaders most exposed to the shift is Argentine President Javier Milei, who will run for reelection in 2027.

Milei built his political identity in close association with Trump. He shares Trump’s aggressive rhetoric and defends economic policies that favor big business. If MAGA loses strength internationally, Milei may face additional difficulties sustaining his project.

Of course, Argentina’s election will depend above all on the country’s own economic and social conditions. But the international environment also matters. The scenario that favored Milei’s rise may be starting to unravel.

Lula’s victory and Trump’s defeat do not mean the end of the far right. But they show that its expansion is not inevitable. They also show there is room for an alternative founded on sovereignty, social justice and peace.

In 2026, Brazil and the United States showed signs of change. In 2027, Argentina may complete that movement. And Milei may be the next to discover that history has changed direction.

This opinion peice, which does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Panamerican Dispatch, first appeared in Brasil 247, has been translated with express authorization from its editor-in-chief, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

The best thing that happened in October was Senator Flávio Bolsonaro’s electoral defeat. The second best was his flight to the United States. He may boast that he will lead the opposition from there, but that will not happen. It never has. Political leaders who were more important than him have returned to Brazil weaker, when they came back from exile at all. There is no sign of a return anyway, at least not for the next four years.

Bolsonaristas unhappy with the 2022 election results praying for Jesus to enact an authoritarian military coup. (photo: social media)

His absence will leave a gap. Had he stayed, he would have been the leader of the opposition. Without him, the opposition will fight over who its new leader should be, if anyone steps up at all. Most likely, the opposition will split. That will favor the government, which will be able to form the alliances it needs to carry out its agenda.

The Brazilian Army is breathing a sigh of relief. The purge promised in the event of a Bolsonaro victory will not happen. Nor will there be the “housecleaning” at Itamaraty, Brazil’s foreign ministry, that his brother threatened. The Supreme Federal Court (STF) will be able to settle its own matters in peace, without the sword of Damocles the new senators would have held over it. The people who made impeaching justices a campaign banner are the same ones now facing investigations overseen by the Supreme Court.

Even jailed former Banco Master chief Daniel Vorcaro is better off with Bolsonaro gone. Now he can finally reveal the truth about the “Dark Horse” Bolsonaro biopic fiasco. We are also spared that headache. It will be the film nobody ever sees, because it will never be released.

The governors elected by Bolsonarismo will hit the brakes. Cleitinho, Moro, Tarcísio and Ruas will depend on funding and cooperation from the presidential palace to govern. The retreat of Bolsonarismo (and of right wing extremism) will help the country grow, which is what the majority of Brazilians who have not fallen down the far right rabbit hole want most.

Alex Solnik is the author of 20 books and has worked as a professional journalist for over 50 years. He was arrested and tortured by Brazil’s US-backed Military dictatorship in 1973, an experience he later wrote about in the book, O dia em que conheci Brilhante Ustra. Solnik was born in Ukraine, then part of the Soviet Union, and immigrated to Brazil with his parents in 1958. He is currently a pundit and columnist for Brasil 247.

This opinion piece, which does not necessarily express the opinion of Panamerican Dispatch originally appeared in Brasil 247, was translated with express authorization from the editor-in-chief, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

On October 18, over half the population of the small town of Paudalho, Pernambuco came out to the streets to show support for Lula, in a scenario underway in hundreds of towns and cities across Brazil that day

The people built this victory with courage, hope and an extraordinary ability to mobilize. Between the first round and the runoff, we won more than 10 million votes. We grew in every state and in the Federal District. We flipped the result in more than 100 municipalities. Our opponent flipped it in just one. Brazil also recorded its lowest abstention rate since 2006. Millions of Brazilians decided they would not stand on the sidelines of history.

Popular mobilization was the main force behind this victory. Brazil saw a remarkable wave of political participation. Young people took to the streets, organized large demonstrations, drew crowds and mobilized schools and universities. They showed that a new generation is ready to take its place in building the country’s future. Students led the way with their irreverence, creativity and organizing skill. From mass rallies to dialogue brigades on the outskirts of cities to fan communities, young people showed that politics can again be a place for hope, belonging and change. When democracy is threatened, artists and intellectuals take a stand, because there is no full citizenship without culture and no democracy without freedom of expression.

Older Brazilians bravely went to the polls. Their experience, historical memory and long record in social and democratic struggles were essential to the mobilization. Women, LGBT people and Afro-Brazilians were also leaders of this victory. In the streets, online, in communities, in workplaces and in families, they mobilized to defend democracy, rights and a future with more equality. Indigenous peoples also played a major role in defending democracy, national sovereignty, their territories, their original rights and the environment. They are indispensable historic and political actors in building a Brazil that is more just, democratic and plural. Their voices were decisive in defending life, in fighting misogyny, racism and prejudice against LGBT people, and in affirming that there is no true democracy without participation, freedom and equality.

Our activists wrote one of the finest chapters in the Workers’ Party’s history. In every city and neighborhood, on the outskirts and in the interior, thousands of comrades did what they have always known how to do. They organized the people, talked, listened, persuaded and turned hope into collective action. They never gave up, even in the hardest moments of our history, and they showed their strength once again. The comeback began in the streets, in collective work, in generosity and in the conviction that Brazil is worth every effort.

The mobilization was also extraordinary on social media. “Lula’s Army,” led by Rep. André Janones, joined forces with party activists, grassroots communicators and millions of supporters. Together they helped change the digital debate and counter disinformation.

This victory went beyond party lines. Allied parties, popular movements, unions, artists, intellectuals and broad sectors of civil society took part. So did liberals, conservatives and people on the democratic right. They recognized the seriousness of the threat posed by a continuation of Bolsonarismo. Despite political differences, they understood that defending democracy must come before electoral disputes.

We won by defending national sovereignty, democracy and a development project committed to the lives of the Brazilian people. We defended the public Unified Health System (SUS), education for the whole school day, universal access to day care, a stronger response to violence and expanded social programs. We called for an end to the 6x1 work schedule (six days of work, one day off) and for free public transportation. We called for using national wealth to create development, jobs and opportunity in Brazil.

We stood up to lies, denialism, political violence and attempts at foreign interference in Brazil’s democratic process. We will tie national development to income distribution, higher wages, broader labor rights and shorter working hours. We will fight inequalities of class, race and ethnicity, gender and region. We will also build in environmental sustainability and respect for work in the countryside and in the city.

Voters elected Lula to bring change. His new term should open a cycle of structural change. The priorities are reform of the justice system, reform of the political and electoral system, and democratic regulation of the big digital platforms. Brazil must deepen its democracy, confront historic inequalities and make sure development brings better living conditions to its people.

We will build a national strategy for digital and technological sovereignty. It will include investment in science, artificial intelligence and Brazilian technologies, data protection and wider access to digital tools. We must confront technological dependence and the concentration of power in the big platforms. These changes must serve democracy, national development and the rights of the population, without imposing austerity on the poorest.

Brazilians have entrusted us with four more years to govern the country. Our responsibility is to make this a time of great achievements, expanding gains, strengthening rights and deepening dialogue with society. Lula said this will be a government of much dialogue.

The PT’s role is to be a permanent bridge between the government, political parties, social movements and different sectors of society. It must keep alive the democratic energy that showed up in the election. We will push for a government in which the people take part in political decisions, with participatory budgeting. We will keep the public mobilized to deliver the program that elected Lula president!

Celebrating this achievement does not lessen our responsibility to face the challenges that remain. Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro fled Brazil just two days after the runoff result, amid corruption allegations and investigations. His flight shows how serious the political moment is.

Flávio Bolsonaro, a fugitive in the United States, wrote a letter calling himself “the real president.” He did not recognize the election result and cited false claims about the vote. He contests the result of elections that were legitimate, auditable and transparent. Those elections expressed popular sovereignty in choosing state legislatures, the federal Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, governors and the presidency. The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and all political parties, including the Liberal Party (PL), recognized the results.

This is not the first time the Bolsonaro family has refused to accept an election result. In 2022, the family contested the results while planning a coup attempt and the assassination of the elected president and vice president. Democratic institutions defused that attempt. It ended with the imprisonment of Jair Bolsonaro and the military officers involved. Now Flávio Bolsonaro’s letter calls for outside interference. That marks a new step in the authoritarian reaction of those who lost at the polls.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s position on the election result and on Flávio Bolsonaro’s presence on American soil also demands attention. Brazil will not accept foreign interests interfering in its democracy. Nor will it accept political disputes serving as a pretext to disrespect the sovereign will of the Brazilian people in elections that were widely monitored and recognized as fair.

We are also deeply concerned about episodes of political violence in the last days of the campaign and after the vote. On Oct. 24, a rock thrown during a motorcade hit Iara Pimentel, a PT city councilwoman in Montes Claros, in Minas Gerais state, in the face.

There are allegations of killings, attempted killings, assaults, threats and intimidation. There are also serious accounts of electoral harassment in workplaces, with threats of firing, persecution and pressure against workers who voted for Lula. It is unacceptable for anyone to threaten the free exercise of the vote, one of democracy’s most basic rights, through any form of violence or coercion. The Labor Prosecutor’s Office should pay special attention to complaints of electoral harassment and act firmly to investigate and hold those responsible to account.

We also instruct municipal and state directorates to report all incidents of political violence and electoral harassment to the National Directorate through the form at pt.org.br. This will let the party track cases, send complaints to the proper authorities and take the appropriate steps.

The electoral victory does not end the task of defending democracy. We must turn it into permanent popular organization, strengthening the PT’s base committees and directorates in the countryside and in cities. That requires expanding political education, holding local assemblies, strengthening popular, social and union movements, and creating permanent spaces for listening and participation.

The party must adopt new forms of organization and mobilization, renew its communication and expand its presence in communities. It must turn electoral support into organized social force.

We must preserve social participation, strengthen popular organization and keep open the paths of dialogue and mobilization that made this victory possible. The PT will also strengthen its dialogue with different religious traditions, while respecting freedom of conscience and the secular nature of the state.

We will build common ground around democracy, social justice, solidarity and human dignity. We will confront religious intolerance and the use of faith as a weapon against rights and democracy.

We urge directorates, social movements and labor union confederations to stay organized. They should help defend democratic institutions and monitor the carrying out of the program voters approved at the polls.

Afro-Brazilians played a decisive role in Lula’s victory and in the popular mobilization to defend democracy, national sovereignty and a country with less inequality. In outlying neighborhoods, social movements, online and in the streets, Afro-Brazilian men and women were on the front lines of the campaign. They confronted racism, disinformation and the inequalities that have long limited their political participation. This leadership must lead to more policies for racial equality, more Afro-Brazilian representation in politics and a fight against structural and institutional racism.

The PT should call on its activists, sector groups, secretariats for fighting racism, elected lawmakers and the Afro-Brazilian movement to mount a broad mobilization during Black November. Nov. 20, the National Day of Zumbi and Black Consciousness, should be a milestone for struggle, reflection and organization. The party must fill the streets and social media with rallies, assemblies, training and debates in communities. The message is that there is no full democracy without racial justice, historical reparations and equal opportunity.

The young people who took to the streets should have a central place in this new moment. The PT needs to open its doors, renew how people take part and build new paths of political organization with young people. We call for a broad campaign to recruit young members to the Workers’ Party. It should include spaces for listening, training, participation and welcome for a generation that showed such willingness to build Brazil’s future. The PT must take on its historic responsibility to continue and deepen the democratic and popular project. It must train new leaders, renew its practices and strengthen its organization for the challenges of the period after Lula.

On Jan. 5, 2027, Lula will be sworn in as president for the fourth time, in what will be his last term in office. It will be a historic day that marks a path of struggle and change for Brazil. To celebrate, we invite state directorates, lawmakers, unions and social movements to organize caravans so activists can attend and celebrate the inauguration in Brasília.

We have called a meeting of the PT National Directorate for Nov. 13, 2026, to review the elections and analyze the political situation. The meeting will produce a document with the party’s detailed political assessment of the historic victory and guidance for the next cycle.

We celebrate this achievement with joy, gratitude and a sense of history. Brazil has shown that democracy has deep roots, that hope can beat fear and that social struggle can change the course of a nation. From the hands of workers to the boldness of students, from the courage of women to the perseverance of our activists, millions of Brazilians made this victory a collective effort.

Brazil wrote an extraordinary page of its history. Now it is time to turn the force of this victory into a new cycle of democracy, rights, sovereignty and social justice.

This public statement from the Workers’ Party national directorate originally appeared as a press release and an article on the party’s website, which can be read in Portuguese here. It was translated by Panamerican Dispatch.

The administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is betting on a Democratic victory in the legislative elections to counterbalance Donald Trump’s influence in the region. Trump has been expanding his reach in Latin America under his second term, and interfering in Brazilian affairs.

The hope within Brazil’s Foreign Ministry is that, by securing a majority in the U.S. Congress, the Democrats could act as a “brake” on the Republican’s offensives and Trump’s destabilizing actions in the region, through a policy that has become known as the “Donroe Doctrine.”

U.S., Mexican, Ecuadorian, Colombian, and Panamanian ships conduct training exercises during PANAMAX 2026 on the Pacific Ocean near Panama, Aug. 7, 2026. (Petty Officer 3rd Class William / U.S. Southern Command)

Since 2025, Brazil has faced various U.S. measures against it, including sanctions, tariffs, and the U.S.-supported escape of Flávio Bolsonaro.

In recent months, however, both the Brazilian government and independent actors have cultivated close ties with Democratic senators and representatives, seeking to build an alliance to shine light on the violations committed under Trump.

The ultimate goal is to ensure that, from 2027 onward, Lula has more room to pursue an independent foreign policy, both in dealings with major global powers and in establishing pragmatic channels with other Latin American governments.

Democrats have issued at least ten statements and letters challenging the White House over its disruptive behavior in Brazil, including actions taken during the country’s electoral process.

Behind the scenes, progressive lawmakers and observers have traveled to Washington to brief U.S. members of Congress on the situation in Brazil.

Whenever Lula has visited the United States, he has also made a point of meeting with some of these representatives. In September, for instance, he dedicated part of his schedule to meetings with Senator Bernie Sanders and New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani.

Just last week, nearly 30 Democratic lawmakers sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio demanding an explanation regarding the Trump administration’s potential role in Flávio Bolsonaro’s flight to the United States.

Until now, however, Democrats have been in the minority in the U.S. Congress. This meant that, despite their pressure, they lacked the votes necessary to establish investigative committees or translate their grievances into concrete actions against Trump.

A different scenario could emerge moving forward, should they win the election. It is possible, for example, that the case of Flávio Bolsonaro’s departure could become the subject of an investigative committee. Democrats want to understand why Trump granted a humanitarian visa to Bolsonaro, while simultaneously suspending such access for over 500,000 people fleeing war-torn countries.

The Brazilian government also anticipates that a Democratic majority could serve as a check on Trump’s global trade policies. Under U.S. rules, trade policy is the prerogative of Congress. Trump had managed to circumvent this reality by declaring a “national emergency.” Once that mechanism was exhausted, he concocted spurious investigations into dozens of foreign governments to justify his tariffs.

International observers hope that, with a Democratic majority in Congress, the political cost to Trump for certain decisions would increase.

Within the Lula administration, there is an expectation that a Democratic victory could lead to a shift in the bilateral relationship. There is an alignment of agendas: Brazil seeks to curb U.S. encroachment in the region, while Democrats aim to use Trump’s diplomatic proposals as an example of the dangerous path his foreign policy has taken. With a new balance of power, Lula hopes to establish a pragmatic relationship with the White House. The prevailing view in Brasília is that the United States is an “unavoidable” partner and that the best course for national diplomacy is to seek common ground in areas of shared interest.

Marco Rubio and Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira are expected to meet in December to assess the bilateral agenda. Lula is also set to attend the G20 summit, and the possibility of a meeting between Trump and the Brazilian president cannot be ruled out.

This article was originally published by ICL Noticias. It was translated by Panamerican Dispatch. You can read it, in its original Portuguese, here.

Approximately 210 million voters in the United States head to the polls this Tuesday, October 3, to elect all 435 members of the House of Representatives, as well as 35 of the 100 seats in the Senate.

Americans will also elect governors in 36 of the country’s 50 states. The outcome of the election will determine President Donald Trump’s future in the White House, as the Democrats could secure a majority in Congress, a shift that would also have political repercussions for Brazil.

Traffic moves along rain-slicked Pennsylvania Avenue before the U.S. Capitol Building on October 11, 2026, in Washington, DC. (Photo by J. David Ake/Getty Images)

That is because the U.S. opposition has questioned the White House over alleged interference by Trump in Brazil, such as U.S. funding for campaigns directed against the Supreme Federal Court.

Currently, both legislative chambers hold a narrow Republican majority, which has given Trump greater freedom to implement his policies.

Opinion polls have pointed toward a Democratic victory, driven in part by the rising cost of living. The conflict initiated by Trump against Iran is cited as one of the causes of inflation, as it led to an increase in fuel prices following restrictions on navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

Over the past few months, the U.S. president’s disapproval rating has risen to 61%, against an approval rating of 36%, according to an average of polls calculated by The New York Times.

Amid this unfavorable landscape, Trump has promised a $5,000 payment to every adult in the country should the Republicans win the House and Senate elections. He has spent the last few days traveling across the nation to campaign for his allies.

Paulo Abrão, executive director of the Brazil Office Alliance, an organization that connects Brazilian researchers working in the U.S., says that the outcome of the election will determine the degree of control the legislative branch will have over President Trump.

“If the opposition wins one of the chambers, they could expand investigations, demand explanations from the administration, and hinder his legislative agenda. Control of the House is particularly significant for oversight,” Abrão told Agência Brasil.

Abrão added that control of the Senate grants the power to confirm or reject the appointments of officials and judges.

“If the Republicans retain both chambers, Trump will have a more favorable political environment to advance his agenda, though this does not eliminate internal disagreements within his own party,” said Abrão.

Trump has raised a series of questions concerning the security of the U.S. electoral system. In 2020, after losing to Joe Biden, Trump claimed the election had been rigged, though he provided no evidence. Last week, when asked by journalists, Trump stated that he would respect the outcome “if it’s an honest election.”

Foreign Policy

There is an expectation that a Democratic victory could lead to shifts in U.S. foreign policy, particularly over the situation involving Iran. Abrão notes that the U.S. presidency holds a wide margin of maneuver in foreign policy, even without a majority in Congress.

“A more independent Congress could increase political costs, scrutinize decisions, and contest the allocation of resources, even if it does not directly control diplomacy,” he said.

Implications for Brazil

Any political weakening of Donald Trump would likely also affect U.S.-Brazil relations, which have been marked by significant tariffs and friction with the administration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. That is particularly the case if Trump should lose his majority in one or both chambers of Congress.

Abrão says that Democrats could expand the investigation into the Bolsonaro family’s activities in the United States, exposing their connections to the Trump administration.

“Democratic lawmakers have already been demanding explanations [over alleged interference by Trump in Brazil],” said Abrão. “The core issue would be to clarify whether U.S. state instruments were used to favor a foreign political group, and, if so, for what reasons and on what grounds.”

He points out that a congressional investigation could examine allegations against Meta, the parent company of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, over the favoring of candidate Flávio Bolsonaro during the Brazilian elections.

The reduction in the social media reach of accounts linked to candidate Lula was attributed by the tech giant to “technical issues.”

“A shift in control of Congress could transform inquiries, currently expressed through letters from lawmakers, into investigations with a greater capacity to gather evidence and demand answers,” said Abrão, who is also a law professor. “This is not automatic. It depends on the priorities of the new majority and could face resistance and legal challenges.”

In recent weeks, Democratic members of Congress have questioned the White House in letters on a range of issues, from Meta’s actions during the Brazilian elections to the decision to revoke the visa of Brazil’s ambassador to the U.S., Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti.

Last Thursday, October 29, the Democrats demanded answers over potential White House involvement in the departure of Senator Flávio Bolsonaro from Brazil, which occurred despite a Brazilian court order prohibiting him from leaving the country.

Flávio is facing legal proceedings for money laundering, corruption, and currency evasion.

This article was originally published by Agência Brasil. It was translated by Panamerican Dispatch. You can read the original, in Portuguese, here.

Israeli Menachem Booky Halevy is one of the people identified in the exfiltration of Liberal Party (PL) Sen. Flávio Bolsonaro to the United States. Reports describe Halevy as a former agent of Mossad, Israel’s secret service. Flávio Bolsonaro was removed from Brazil two days after he lost the presidential runoff to incumbant President Lula da Silva, of the Workers’ Party (PT).

Like so many fleeing Latin American politicians and drug lords before him, Flávio Bolsonaro was whisked into Miami’s Opa Locka executive airport (Joe Raedle/Getty Images)

Halevy crossed the border from Foz do Iguaçu, in Paraná state, to Puerto Iguazú, Argentina, on the night of Oct. 27. He traveled with Roberto Jorge Alexandre, a former defense lawyer of former President Jair Bolsonaro. The two were in a van that crossed the border about seven minutes before being followed by a vehicle carrying Flávio Bolsonaro and his family.

TV Globo’s “Fantástico” revealed Halevy’s identity on Sunday, Nov. 1, based on Argentine immigration documents. The presence of a former member of one of the world’s best known intelligence services raises suspicions about the structure built to get Flávio Bolsonaro out of Brazil. Justice Alexandre de Moraes of the Supreme Federal Court (STF) had barred him from leaving the country in accordance with Brazilian law, because he a suspect in a multi-million dollar money laundering investigation.

Who is Menachem Booky Halevy

Halevy is a dual Israeli and U.S. national. Reports identify him as a former member of Mossad. Little is publicly known about his career before the exfiltration. The reports do not say when he joined Israeli intelligence, how long he stayed or what role he held.

Mossad is the agency responsible for Israel’s foreign intelligence operations. Those include gathering information, covert activities and special operations outside Israel.

According to CNN Brasil, Halevy arrived in Brazil on Oct. 19, six days before the runoff. The date matters because planning for the escape may have started during the campaign, before Lula’s victory was confirmed.

Information released later indicates that Halevy made three other trips to Brazil in 2026. The purpose of those visits, where he went and whom he met in the country remain unclear.

The exfiltration operation for Flávio Bolsonaro was reportedly given the code name “Alba.”

Crossing the border with a lawyer for Jair Bolsonaro

Argentine immigration records gave new weight to the identification of Halevy. “Fantástico” reported that the records show him crossing into Argentina with Roberto Jorge Alexandre.

Neri Luiz Dala Corte has been identified as the van driver hired hired to take the passengers from Foz do Iguaçu to the Puerto Iguazú airport.

The van went through immigration control about seven minutes before another van linked to Flávio Bolsonaro’s entry into Argentina.

It is still unclear who hired Halevy, what role he played in planning the trip and whether he had contact with representatives of the Argentine or U.S. governments.

An international operation

Flávio Bolsonaro’s escape involved travel by land and air across Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and the United States. After crossing the border, he boarded a Gulfstream G400 with his family. The jet, registration LV-JQW, is operated by the Argentine company Baires Fly.

The plane stopped in Guayaquil, Ecuador, then landed at Opa-locka Executive Airport near Miami on the morning of Oct. 28.

The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal reported that Jason Miller, an ally and political adviser of President Donald Trump, helped organize the flight. Secretary of State Marco Rubio denies that the United States took part in organizing the escape.

In Argentina, reports on how the operation came together also named Santiago Caputo, a top adviser to President Javier Milei.

The mysteries surrounding the former agent

Halevy’s role leaves key questions unanswered. The first is who called on him and what ties he had to Flávio Bolsonaro or his allies. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government may also have taken a direct part in the Bolsonaro family’s plan.

Another question is whether Halevy’s earlier trips to Brazil included meetings or preparations for Flávio Bolsonaro’s removal.

Who paid for the operation is also unknown. That includes the ground transport, the international logistics and the chartered plane.

The Federal Police is investigating how Flávio Bolsonaro left Brazil despite a court order barring him from doing so.

The identification of Halevy is a new lead for reconstructing the network of people involved. So far, no court ruling has established Halevy’s criminal responsibility. There is no proof that Mossad took an institutional role in the exfiltration.

This article first appeared in Revista Fórum, was translated with express authorization of its editor-in-chief, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has won reelection to an unprecedented fourth term. The victory capped one of the most dramatic electoral turnarounds in Brazil’s recent political history. In an extended interview with journalist Leonardo Attuch on TV 247, legal philosopher Alysson Mascaro said the reversal of a bad first round did not come from the traditional machinery of campaign offices. He said it came from workers and young people entering politics directly and on their own.

(Photo: Ricardo Stuckert)

Mascaro said the result at the polls exposed the limits of a purely institutional way of governing. When extremism on the right threatened to tear society apart, he said, grassroots networks took the lead.

The bureaucratic approach collapses in the first round

Mascaro said the campaign in the first round was trapped in a bureaucratic logic. It tried to please big business and social demands at the same time. He described a lukewarm stance built around balance sheets, strict fiscal responsibility and conciliation that failed to energize Lula’s base and failed to slow the resentment mobilized by the far right.

According to Mascaro, the first round was run as three bureaucracies at once: the government’s, the campaign’s and the party’s.

“It was backroom work, showing good numbers and trying to signal security in every direction,” he said. “But something that is safe in every direction usually does not truly please anyone. That model revealed enormous social fatigue with Bolsonarista violence and resentment.”

Mascaro, a professor at the University of São Paulo (USP), said the picture changed only when the risk of imminent defeat and of the dismantling of public institutions became real.

The spark in Niterói and the takeover of the streets

Mascaro said the decisive factor began outside government control and without its guidance. A civic jolt turned passive voters into active organizers. As a symbol of that shift, he pointed to an uprising by law students at Fluminense Federal University (UFF) in Niterói. Their spontaneous protest set off demonstrations in several capitals and inland cities.

Mascaro named three features of the movement:

• Autonomous initiative: People did not wait for formal calls from party offices. They filled public squares, talked with neighbors and broke through apathy.

• The role of regional strongholds: The Northeast’s historic engagement, plus strong vote totals in strategic regions such as northern Minas Gerais, built the margin of victory.

• A change of program under pressure: Pushed by the grassroots, campaign leaders had to take up concrete demands of the working class. These included challenging the 6x1 work schedule (six days of work, one day off) and expanding social benefits. The campaign paired them with a guerrilla communication strategy on social media led by Rep. André Janones.

The limits of conciliation and the dilemma of a fourth term

Mascaro celebrated the popular victory but also issued a sharp warning about the new term. He said Lula’s biography casts him as the nation’s “great dealmaker,” a leader built for agreement and for settling conflicts, not for an open break with financial and rentier elites.

Mascaro said the classic strategy of Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) leaves economic power, interest rates and ownership of strategic sectors untouched. He said it now runs into severe material barriers in contemporary capitalism.

“Lula’s historic logic is to give people consumption, not to confront the exploiters of Faria Lima (São Paulo’s financial district) or renationalize strategic companies that were sold off for next to nothing,” Mascaro said. “That worked in the years of international boom. Today, without deep industrialization and with financial markets sabotaging the economy, the promise of consumption is limited. The government will have to decide whether to keep governing from the top as before or to anchor its term in the strength of an organized people.”

Shielding national assets and geopolitical weight

Mascaro said the election win saved Brazil from a program to speed up the liquidation of its remaining public assets. He cited plans that were in the works to open the way for private and foreign control of public institutions that are over 100 years old, such as the Bank of Brazil (Banco do Brasil) and the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal).

On the international stage, Mascaro said the far right’s defeat in Brazil protects the country’s autonomy against imperialist pressure. He said it also preserves the strength of the BRICS bloc and gives popular movements across Latin America and the Global South room to resist.

Mascaro closed by stressing that the biggest challenge now is to keep people from leaving the streets after the euphoria of victory. He said a sovereign project will require the people to stay organized permanently. He said great social transformations come not from concessions in government offices but from the continuing ability of the masses to fight.

The full interview between Mascaro and Attuch is available on the TV 247 channel: “Alysson Mascaro: ‘Lula turned the race around because the people stepped in.’”

This article originally ran in Brasil 247, was translated to English by with express authorization of its editor-in-chief, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.